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1. Project Data
Name: [CR-FIN. & CORP. RES. AS L/C/TF Number SCL-43850
Country/Department: REPUBLIC OF KOREA Region East Asia and Pacific
Region
Sector/subsector Other industry (80%); Central government
administration (10%); Law and justice (5%), Capital
markets (5%)
KEY DATES
Original Revised/Actual
PCD 05/29/1998 Effective 09/01/1998 10/01/1998
Appraisal 06/25/1998 MTR. 07/01/2001
Approval: 08/06/1998 Closing: 06/30/2002 06/30/2002
Borrower/Implementing Agency. Ministry of Finance and Economy/Ministry of Finance and Economy; Ministry of
Finance and Economy/Financial Supervisory Comnmission, Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Finance and Economy/Korea Fair
Trade Commission
Other Partners
STAFF Current At Appraisal
Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Jean-Michel Severino
Country Manager: Jeffrey S. Gutman M G Sri-Rain Aiyer
Sector Manager: Homi Kharas Hoon Mok Chung
Team Leader at ICR- William Mako Klaus Lorch
ICR Prinmary Author: Williaam Mako
2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsausfactory, HL-Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unhkely, HUN=Highly
Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)
Outcome S
Sustainability -IHL
Institutional Development Impact. H
Bank Perfonnance. S
Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available) ICR
Quality at Entry. S
Project at Risk at Any Time.
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3 1 Original Objective:
Context. At the time this Project was conceived, in early 1998, Korea's financial and corporate sectors
were in crisis. Fourteen of Korea's 27 commercial banks had inadequate capital and 2 were technically
insolvent, leading to their nationalization in January 1997. Among nonbank financial institutions, Korea's
merchant banks were in the most imunediate distress as a result of large loans to troubled business groups
(chaebols) and losses from other investments. During 1997, 13 chaebols with cumulative debt of KRW
28.4 trillion had entered court-supervised insolvency. Local equity analysts estimated that another eighteen
chaebols were at medium or high risk of insolvency. Although a severe international liquidity squeeze
triggered the crisis, structural weaknesses were the fundamental problem. Korea's financial sector had little
comnercial orientation and a limited ability to assess risk. Prudential controls were weak and supervision
fragmented, leading to a decision early in the crisis to create a Financial Supervisory Commilssion (FSC)
and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) to oversee the entire financial sector. The FSC/FSS was obliged,
however, to get up and running Un the midst of a crisis. Within the corporate sector, ill-advised
debt-financed over-investment in low-growth or loss-making businesses had been facilitated by weaknesses
in accounting, auditing, and financial disclosure; weak insider-dominated corporate governance; and an
opaque system of cross debt guarantees, cross shareholdings, and non-comimnercial related party
transactions within chaebols that served to prop up loss-making businesses. Thus, Korea needed both to
respond to imnmediate requirements for crisis resolution and to longer-term requirements for structural
reform.
The Project was designed to support measures to achieve the following results
1. Reduce the likelihood of a systemic failure in the banking and corporate sectors through strengthening
the capacity for monitoring and managing financial risks in these sectors, deepening structural refonns,
and improving debt management;
2. Improve the financial soundness of banks and corporations through a strategy that combined
improvement of financial sector regulation, stronger securities markets, creditor-led worlcouts of
distressed corporations, and capacity-building at banks and corporations to undertake needed
restructurmg; and
3. Deepen a broad process of change in government institutions, banks, and corporations toward less
government involvement in business, enhanced transparency, more focus on financial results, more
openness to global competition and investment through the catalytic role of international advisors, and
strengthening of new regulatory institutions (e.g., the FSC) as well as self-regulatory market
instituitions.
These Project objectives were closely attuned both to the Government's program and to World Bank/IMF
reconmmendations for short-termn crisis resolution and medium-term structural reform.
3.2 Revised Objective:
Not applicable
3 3 Original Components:
Financial Sector Supervision and Crisis Management (US$7.3 million)
The supervision capacity-building effort was intended to support the development of FSC's strategies,
policies, procedures, and capabilities to adopt and enforce prudential regulations and implement
supervisory practices in line with accepted international practices. This activity responded both to
pre-cnsis weakness m financial supervision and immediate needs to merge several existing regulatory
bodies into the new FSC/FSS in the midst of a crisis.
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The support for crisis management was intended to help the FSC develop strategies and processes, design
an organizational structure, and upgrade staff capabilities to manage and resolve financial institution
distress. The two main activities -- support for development and implementation of resolution strategies
anid development of data and methodologies to support resolution -- were immediately relevant to efforts to
resolve distress at a number of financial institutions.
Securities Market Development (US$ 1.44 million)
This had three sub-components: (i) assistance on the securities industhy, market regulation, and
infrastructure was designed to refonr the regulatory framework for self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
and market participants, rationalize market architecture, and assess bond market demand and development
issues; (ii) facilitate development of the Govemment's bond management policy and primary and secondary
markets for Government bonds; and (iii) support greater transparency and professionalism in accounting
and auditing. By supporting improved financial disclosure and the development of altermatives to bank
financing, these activities addressed underlying structural issues.
Debt Management Improvement (US$2.0 million)
This component was designed to address technical issues in the management of sovereign debt, e.g.,
currency, interest, liquidity, refinancing, and other risk; hedging; and back office systems. This component
responded to the Govemnent's need to manage additional debt issued to support financial sector
recapitalization and longer-tenn enhancements in debt management to enhance financial stability.
Corporate Restructuring (US$30.5 million)
This component was to finance the deployment of advisory consortia to Korea's largest banks- Hanvit,
Chohung, Korea First, Seoul, and Korea Exchange. Each consortium was to include intemational and
Korean experts in corporate finance and tumaround, insolvency, accotmting, investment banking, and law.
Each consortium was to build capacity and provide the following support to creditor-led corporate
restructuring efforts: business/financial diagnostics and restructuring recommendations for distressed
chaebol businesses; review of restructuring proposals; advice to the creditors' arbitration cormunittee; and
regular progress reports to the FSC. Thus, this component responded both to widespread corporate distress
and a lack of corporate restructhnng experience within Korea's financial sector.
Corporate Legal/Regulatory Reform (US$1.5 million)
This component supported both ongoing insolvency refonn and reform of corporate govemance. While
creditors enjoyed reasonably strong protections goinig into the crisis, Korea's insolvency system was not
prepared to handle a lot of large insolvency cases in an efficient manner and was not well-suited for the
efficient rehabilitation of distressed-but-viable corporations. Assistance was intended both to support
refonn of Korean insolvency law and training for judges and other msolvency professionals. Corporate
govemance assistance was intended to strengthen the authority and responsibility of corporate boards and
to enhance financial disclosure and monitoring by market participants. Thus, this component responded
both to short-term needs for restructuring distressed corporations and to longer-term structural reforms
aimed at preventing a recurrence of systemic corporate distress and facilitating the development of
altemative means for corporations to meet their needs for capital.
Competition Policy (US$0.42 million)
This component aimed at transferring knowledge on international best practices from OECD countries in
order to strengthen the ability of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to apply the Fair Trade Act.
Thus, this component responded both to poor corporate governance practices that contributed to the
corporate sector's vulnerability to systemic distress and to the Govermment's commnitent under the
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Structural Adjustment Loan program to strengthen the administration and enforcement of competition
policy.
Project Implementation Support (US$0.20 million)
Contingencies (US$4.64 million)
3 4 Revised Co;mponents:
Component; Cost; Rating
FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT; $5,747,090; S
SECURITIES MARKETS DEVELOPMENT; $491,128; S
DEBT MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT; $303,505; S
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING; $17,791,388; S
CORPORATE LEGAL/REGULATORY REFORM; $1,383,909; S
COMPETITION POLICY; $317,463.00; HS
Given the magnitude of Korea's corporate and financial sector distress and uncertainties about how long it
would take relatively inexperienced actors -- such as the FSC/FSS and the workout departments at Lead
Banks -- to develop the in-house capacity to resolve the crisis while pursuing longer-term reforms, this
Project was generously funded at US$48.0 million. In the end, only about US$26 million was needed and
used. This reflects both efficient teaming of international and domestic experts and rapid leaminng by
implementing agencies. There was no change in Project components or objectives, only a reduction in the
cost of Project implementation.
3 5 Quality at Entry:
Because Korea had earlier graduated from World Bank programs, no Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)
was in place when the crisis began. As a result of the involvement of World Bank staff in the December
1997 Emergency Restructuring Loan, the first Structural Adjustment Loan negotiated in March 1998, and
analytical and advisory activity (AAA) support to the FSC in early 1998, the Project team was closely
familiar both with the objective requirements for responding to this crisis and with the Government's
program. By the time of the first identification mission for this Project, both sides were already in
substantial agreement over what needed to be done and how best to proceed.
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
41 Outcome/achievenient of objective-
The Project facilitated the attainment of key goals: (i) reducing the likelihood of systemic failure in the
corporate and banking sectors; (ii) improving the financial soundness of Korea's banks and corporations;
and (iii) promoting increased transparency, competitiveness, and reliance on market mechanisms in Korea's
corporate and financial sectors. Banks that were still under-capitalized as of mid-1998 were subjected to
prompt corrective action or some form of rehabilitation, e.g., downsizing, merger, or recapitalization with
public and/or private funds. Median corporate debt/equity had been reduced below 200% by end-1999,
although one-quarter of Korea's companies remain over-leveraged. Workout agreements for 15 chaebol
affiliates had been negotiated by mid-1999 and workout of Daewoo affiliates had basically been agreed by
end- 1999. Steady progress was made on financial regulation and supervision, development of
self-regulatory organizations for key market participants, and some insolvency reforms A business law
amendment covering minority shareholder protections and enhanced corporate boards was enacted in July
2001.
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4 2 Outputs by components
Financial Sector Supervision and Crisis Management. Almost all consultant recommendations on FSS
organization, staffing, personnel policy, and budgeting were accepted. Agreed actions to bring prudential
regulations and supervisory practices into line with international best practices have been implemented
Consultant reviews of proposed strategies and financial projections for distressed banks facilitated
FSC/FSS efforts at stabilization and resolution.
Securities Market Development. The component produced consultant studies on securities market
architecture, self-regulation, and regulation; seminars and stLdies on a government bond market; and advice
on continuing professional education and ethical standards for accountants.
Debt Management Improvement. Consultants provided the expertise necessary for development of the
Sovereign Asset Liability Management System (SALMS) that now enables tlhe MOFE Treasury Bureau to
manage and assess govemment debt in order to minimize costs and risks.
Corporate Restructuring. Consultants provided immediate assistance to Lead Bank corporate workout
units in assessing corporate restructuring proposals and longer-lasting assistance in corporate restlucturing
issues, methodologies, and techniques. Through frequent seminars and on-site training in corporate
restructuring, the advisors also helped the Lead Banks in such areas as credit evaluation and monitoring
systems for early warning of corporate distress.
Corporate Legal/Regulatory Reform. Corporate governance assistance included overseas study and a
comparative international analyses of corporate governance standards and practices, which led to
legislation enacted in July 2001 to raise minority shareholder protections and strengthen corporate boards.
Insolvency reform assistance, including overseas study and comparative analyses of other insolvency
regimes, is influencing a Ministry of Justice working group tasked with prepanng insolvency refonn
legislation for the National Assembly.
Competition Policy. Information-sharing on OECD best practice, training, and overseas internships have
supported KFTC's campaign to eliminate most cross-debt guarantees and improper related party
transactions within chaebols; abolish twenty cartels, under 1999 legislation; and improve standards and
procedures for reviews of cartels and merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions
4 3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return
Not applicable
4 4 Financial r ate of return
Not applicable
4.5 Institutional development impact.
The Project's institutional development impact has been high. The FSC/FSS has been melded into an
effective regulator and supervisor, whose prudential regulations, supervisory procedures and staff,
institutional support, and institutional memory in dealing with financial sector distress have vastly
improved since 1998. Between 1997 and 2001, stock market capitalization and volume of trading
increased 261% and 233% respectively. Within MOFE, a new infornation system now enables the
Treasury Bureau to do a better job managing the costs and risks of government debt. Professional
education and ethics for the accounting/auditing profession has been upgraded; additional entities are
subject to extermal audit; and more corporate boards now have audit committees. Corporate govermance
standards and practices have improved, especially in terms of the appointment of independent corporate
directors and protections for minority shareholders. The KFTC is vigorously implementing fair trade
legislation and -- by virtue of its expenence in Korea, continuing close collaboration with OECD, and
Knowledge Partnership with the World Bank -- is in a position to disseminate its competition policy
know-how to developing and transition economies around the world.
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5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5 1 Factors outside the control of government or nmplenmenting agency:
Commitments by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other international finance agencies of
up to $58 billion provided both substantial direct financial support and an expression of confidence to
global capital markets in Korea's approach to resolving its corporate/financial sector crisis. In addition,
U.S. Federal Reserve policies during 1998-99 provided a supportive international economic environument
for the Korean Government to pursue corporate/financial sector restructuring and reform.
While the Govenunent could initiate many measures, the National Assembly had the final say on important
matters, e.g., the ceiling on public funds for financial sector support/recapitalization; and insolvency
legislation. Going into the crisis, Korea's legal framework provided reasonably strong protections for
creditors which facilitated progress on corporate restructuring.
Especially because it was seeking to end a long tradition of intervention in the economy, the Government
could not directly force banks and corporations to pursue any particular restructuring action. To
emphasize this, the FSC encouraged banks and nonbank financial institutions to agree among themselves
on a binding set of corporate restructuring principles and procedures, including arbitration of inter-creditor
disputes by a Corporate Restructuring Coordination Committee (CRCC).
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:
The Project benefitted from the Government's sotmd macroeconomic policies and generally strong
commitment to corporate and financial sector restructuring and reform. The first chainnan and key staff at
the FSC/FSS and key staff at MOFE, MOJ, and KFTC were highly supportive of Project goals and timely
pursuit of these goals.
5 3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control.
Project implementation staff at MOFE and FSC were closely involved in Project preparation and
implementation; quickly adopted World Bank procedures for selection of consultants and project financial
management; carefully monitored results and supported project supervision; and were amenable to
exchange of views with Bank staff on policy and technical issues relating to the Project.
5 4 Costs and financing
As shown in Annex 2, overall disbursements by component were about 60% of available funding. In
absolute terms, the Corporate Restructuring component provided the greatest savings -- US$17.8 million
actual versus US$30.5 million available. As noted above (section 3.4), this reflects generous funding to
offset uncertainties at the start of the Project as well as efficient teaming and rapid learning by
implementing agencies, which substantially reduced actual requirements for Project financing.
6. Sustainability
6 1 Rationale for sustainablity rating:
The f SC/FSS has become an effective regulator and supervisor, whose prudential regulations, supervisory
procedures and staff, institutional support, and experience have vastly improved since 1998. Within
MOFE, a new information system has improved the Treasury Bureau's ability to manage govermnent debt.
Professional education anid ethics for the accounting/auditing profession has been upgraded; additional
entities are subject to external audit; and more corporate boards now have audit committees. Corporate
govemance has improved, especially in tenns of the appointment of independent corporate directors and
protections for minority shareholders. The KFTC has become a vigorous advocate and regulator of fair
competition.
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6 2 Transition arrangement to regutlar operations
The short-term issues relating to the 1997 financial crisis have largely been resolved As for longer-term
reforms, Project activities to support these have already been integrated into the regular operation of the
FSS/FSC, MOFE, Korea Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and KFTC. The major outstanding
item is completion of work on insolvency reform and submission of reform legislation to the National
Assembly.
World Bank staff have remained in regular semi-annual contact with implementing agency counterparts as
a result of the World Bank's involvement in the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the
IMF's post-program reviews and Article IV consultations. It is anticipated that continued World Bank
involvement in such missions will provide a regular opportunity for general updates on financial
supervision, securities markets, and corporate governance. Bank staff will take care to follow up on
progress on the development of insolvency reform legislation.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank
7.1 Lending.
Project objectives and design responded to short-term requirements for supportuig establishment of the
FSS/FSC and resolving corporate/financial sector distress as well as to longer-term requilrements for
supporting reforms in financial disclosure, corporate governance, insolvency, and competition policy and
necessary developments in securities markets infrastructure. Project objectives were consistent both with
the Govenmment's objectives and with the World Bank's assessment of requirements for supporting crisis
resolution and corporate/financial sector reform. The Project's emphasis on blending intemnational and
local expertise facilitated the introduction of intemational best practices, capacity-building, and efficient
iniplementation of the Project. More particularly, the following elements were highly satisfactory: speed of
preparation and speed of implementation, especially given the size of the Loan; knowledge transfer and the
quality of advice and technical assistance; depth in tenns of supporting the Govermuent's institLtional
change agenda, rather than just providing techiucal solutions; coverage in tenrs of the breadth and debt of
Project components; and efficiency in tenns of the use of regular Bank budget funding relative to Loan
disbursements.
7 2 Supervision
Bank staff were closely involved with implementing agencies m providing ongoing techlnical advice;
advising the counterparts on project planning and on consultant selection procedures; and monitoring
Project deliverables. In some cases, especially with the corporate restructunng component, Bank iLrles on
consultant selection caused some delays in deploying international advisors to assist Lead Bankcs with
resolution of acute corporate distress. Turnover m Bank staff caused some delays in getting no-objections
later in the Project, but supervision during the critical early phases of the Project was strong
7 3 Overall Bank performance:
The Bank's lending performance was highly satisfactory for some components and satisfactory overall
Supervision was satisfactory. The Bank's overall performance was satisfactory.
Borrower
7 4 Preparation.
The Government's preparation was satisfactory. During preparation, there was close cooperation between
the Government and the Bank. The MOFE, FSC/FSS, MOJ, and KFTC were actively engaged and
ensured that the Project's objectives and design supported the Govermunent's program for crisis resolution
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and corporate/financial sector refonn.
7.5 Government implementation performiance:
Implementation performance by both Project Implementation Units (PlUs), at the MOFE and FSC, were
satisfactoiy.
7 6 Implementing Agency:
Implementing Agencies showed good ownership of the Project. This was a large and diverse project
Implementation Agency perfonnance was highly satisfactory for some components, especially competition
policy, and satisfactory overall.
7 7 Overall Borrower performance:
The Borrower's overall perfonnance was satisfactoly.
8. Lessons Learned
This Project provided a unique perspective on Korea's response to its corporate/financial sector crisis.
Thus, comments here include lessons on crisis response as well as on design and Implementation of similar
projects.
Responses to corporate/financial sector crisis
o A credible threat of foreclosure/bankruptcy is needed to elicit debtor cooperation with court-supervised
rehabilitations or out of court workouts. Korea entered the crisis with reasonably strong protections
for creditors. While progress on corporate operational restructuring was slower than had been hoped
for, the corporate workouts agreed during 1998-99 did imnpose significant losses on controlling
shareholders and managements and thus addressed important moral hazard concerns.
* While an efficient framework for out of court workouts is necessary in a systemic crisis and can
financially stabilize distressed companies and resolve some instances of corporate distress, permanent
solutions may require a court-supervised process. An efficient framework for out of court workouts is
needed to avoid saturation of the courts. But final allocations of losses and risk -- between creditors
over (i) treatment of secured vs. unsecured debt, (ii) provisions of new credits, and (iii) the sale or
transfer of converted corporate equity and restructured credits; and between creditor-shareholders and
public shareholders over the allocation of equity restructuring losses -- are difficult and
tine-consuming to resolve in an out of court process. Delays may impose additional losses on the
company subject to workout. Ultimately, resort to a cotut-supervised process may be necessary to
resolve such disputes in a timely mamner.
* Governments must be ready to impose losses on the shareholders of domestic financial institutions and
force the resolution of over-valued assets. Otherwise, partially restructured companies may end up in a
"zombiie" state with uncompetitive cost structures, capital tied up in loss-maling or low-return assets,
and unable to obtain financing. Regulatory forbearance, especially on loss recognition, may discourage
follow on asset sales and other operational restructuring transactions.
* Barring some overriding public policy purpose, all significant tax, legal, and regulatory impediments to
corporate restructuring must be eliminated. Impediments may include tax treatment of debt
restructuring; tax treatment of mergers, acquisitions, spinoffs, and other corporate reorganizations,
excessive transfer taxes; and protections for public shareholders. Valid protections for public
shareholders may necessitate a court-based approach to effect timely equity restructuring.
* Some central body should be responsible for driving financial sector restructuring and malcing adequate
corporate restructuring a condition for bank recapitalization. The country's ministly of finance should
normally play a leading role. To avoid conflicts of interest between minimizing
restructuring/recapitalization costs and safeguarding the nation's financial system, the financial
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supervisor should nonmally focus on financial sector regulation/supervtsion and keep out of direct
involvement in corporate/financial sector restructuring.
* There must be sufficient implementation capacity to conduct due diligence, structLre and negotiate
corporate workouts, project the capital adequacy of banks and nonbank finanicial institutions, conclude
corporate asset sales, structLre and negotiate public and private recapitalizations of financial
institations, and manage converted corporate equity. The demands for professional services and the
costs in a systemic crisis are enormous.
* Crisis efforts to resolve immediate colporate/financial sector distress should be supplemented with
other measures to promote corporate/financial sector reform. Key measures include improvements in
financial regulation/supervision, improved financial disclosure, stronger corporate governance, and
effective competition policy.
Proiect desirn/implementation
* In a complex project involving multiple components and multiple implementing agencies, consistent
broad-based Govermnent support for all aspects of crisis response and long-term reform is needed in
order to make consistent progress toward the completion of project goals.
* If a TA project coincides with an adjustment lending program, there should be effective linkages
between all components of the TA project and adjustment lending.
* In a complex TA project, adequate fumding and consistent staffing is essential for effective supervision
* It can be difficult to assemble an advisory consortium with the requisite skcills in corporate finance,
accounting/audit, investment banking, and law. As additional companies are added to an advisory
consortium, it can become much more difficult to reach consensus on appropriate courses of action.
Thus, it is useful to keep a consortium's organization as simple as possible; indeed, the ideal solution is
to retam a finn that combines all of the needed skills. Companies attuned to success fee-based
compensation may also find it more difficult to adjust to this type of project; hence, it probably makes
sense for advisory consortia to be run by finns whose fees are nonnally time-based. Finally, it is
important to define potential conflicts of interest at the start of the project and ensure that consultants
involved in the project avoid any real or perceived conflicts.
* Procurement rules and procedures should be compatible with the urgency of a systemic
corporate/financial sector crisis and the technical sophistication needed in a countly at Korea's level of
development. For this Project, the acceleration of procurement procedures and waivers to consultant
fee ceilings, under the Bank's procurement rules, took extraordinary effort by Bank and Implementing
Agency staff at a time when a focus on teclmical issues of corporate/financial sector crisis abatement
should have had thc highest prionty. Complex procurement rules that delay urgently needed financial
advisors may degrade the effectiveness and value of similar projects in the future.
9. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agency
The Borrower and Implementing Agencies regarded the Bank's perfonnance on lending and supervision as
satisfactory overall. Some components were rated higher. The Borrower and Implementing Agencies cited
the following as key lessons from the Project:
* The value of outside intemnational best-practice experience in addressmig corporate and financial sector
distress;
* The need for expeditious procurement procedures in a crisis situation;
* The importance of reaching a consensus within/among advisory groups, financial institution clients,
and distressed companies on restructuring requirements;
* The importance of reaching consensus on supporting legal/regulatory reforms among govermment
officials, private sector experts; and foreign experts; and
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* lhe importance of legislative reform and institutional capacity-building to support long-tein recovery
from a crisis and ongoing refonns to avoid a future crisis.
A complete summary of the Borrower's final evaluation report is attached to this ICR and more detailed
comments from the Borrower and Implementing Agencies are available in Project files.
(b) Cqfinancrers
Not applicable
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector).
Not applicable
10. Additional Information
Not used
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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome / Impact Indicators:
'indi'cator/Matrix Projected in last PSR ' Actual/Latest Estimate
Adequate quality and timeliness of action 100% by June 1999
plans, and largely consistent implementation.
Commercial banks meeting BiS capital 87 5% by December 1999 (1)
adequacy, or being under extemal
supervision or closed, debt-equity ratio of
large-scale, non-financial chaebol
corporations substantially reduced
Role of SROs (KICPA, securities markets) 100% by July 2001 (2)
strengthened, FSC/lead banks actvely
seeking foreign capital in working out
banks/debtors: expanded mandated
disclosure to minority shareholders
(1) Cormnercial banks either capital-adequate or intervened. Median corporate debt/equity <200% by
end-1999, but one-quarter of companies still over-leveraged.
(2) Steady progress on all items; business law reform covering minority shareholder protections and
eiTlanced corporate boards enacted July 2001.
Output Indicators:
Indicator/Matrix , xProjecteai last R - Actual/Latest Estimate
Revised, detailed action plans; monitoring 100% by June 1999
systems established, advisors integrated into
"war room' operational activities
Large scale commercial banking sector 100% by December 1999 (1)
undergoing substantial restructuring At
least 16 inter-linked business groups worked
out with substantial assistance of
project-funded advisors
Consultancies ublized to the extent foreseen 100% by December 1999 (1)
under the project and largely staffed with
experts with extensive intemational
expenence
End of project
(1) Following initial bank mergers in 1998, additional banks take remedial actions and/or are merged
and/or recapitalized. 15 chaebol affiliate workouts negotiated by mid-1999 and worlcout of Daewoo
affiliates basically agreed by end- 1999.
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal - Actual/Latest Percentage of
Estimate - Estimate Appraisal
Project Cost By Component biS$,million US$ million
Financial Sector Supervision & Crisis Management 7.30 5 75 79
Securities Market Development 1.44 0 49 34
Debt Management Improvement 2.00 0.30 15
Corporate Restructuring 30.50 17.79 58
Corporate Legal/Regulatory Refonn 1.50 1 38 92
Competition Policy 0.42 0.32 76
Project linplementation Support 0.20 0.01 5
Total Baseline Cost 43.36 26 04
Physical Contingencies 0.60 0.00 0
Price Contingencies 4.04 0.00 0
Total Project Costs 48.00 26.04
Total Financing Required 48.00 26.04
Amounts shown are project costs financed, as estimated at appraisal and actual disbursements.
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Expnditure Category BProcrement Method Total Cost -
1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 (.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00
(0.00) (0.00) (O 00) (0.00) (0.00)
3. Services 0.00 0.00 38.88 0 00 38 88
(0.00) (0.00) (24.64) (0.00) (24.64)
4. Miscellaneous 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
___________ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (O 00) (0.00)
5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 (.00 0 00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total 0.00 0.00 38.88 0.00 38.88
(0.00) (0.00) (24.64) (0.00) (24 64)
"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.
2Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractcd staff
of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and iicremcntal operating costs related to (i)
managing the project, and (n) re-lending project funds to local govcmment units.
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Annex 3. Economic Costs -and B;nefits
Not applicable
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Annex 4. Bank Inputs
(a) Missions
Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Perfonrnance Rating
(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) lrnplcmentation Development
Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective
Identification/Preparation
02/06/1998 9 PSD Advisor (1), PSD Spec (5);
Financial Spec (3);
03/27/1998 / PSD Advisor (1)
Appraisal/Negotiation
06/24/1998 8 Team Leader (1), PSD Spec.
(2), Legal (2), Financial
Spec. (3)
06/26/1998 4 Task Manager (1); Legal (1);
Financial Spec.(l); Lead
Economist (1)
Supervision
09/27/1998 3 Team Leader (1), PSD S S
Specialist (1), Team
Assistant (1)
02/17/1999 1 Task Team Leader (I) S S
01/20/2000 1 TASK TEAM LEADER (1) S S
12/20/2000 1 LEAD PSD SPECIALIST (I) S S
06/11/2001 1 SR. PSD SPECIALIST (1) S S
ICR
10/02/2002 1 TASK MANAGER (1)
(b) Staff:
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate
No. Staff weeks US$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation Not available /a
Appraisal/Negotiation Not available 249.7 /a
Supervision Not available 757.3 /b
ICR Not available /b
Total Not available 1,007 0
/a Total amount includes Identification through Negotiation.
/b Total amount includes Supervision through ICR.
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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substanhal, M=Modest. N-Negligible, NA-Not Applicable)
Rating
D Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA
O Sector Policies O H * SU O M O N O NA
El Physical O H OSUOM O N * NA
Ol Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA
El Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA
El Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA
Social
E Poverty Reduction 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA
al Gender 0 H OSUOM O N * NA
a Other (Please specqfy) O H OSUOM O N * NA
O Private sector development 0 H 0 SU * M 0 N 0 NA
Ol Public sector management O H SU O M O N 0 NA
O Other (Please specify) 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA
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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6 1 Bank performance Rating
O Lending OHS OS OU OHU
[ SLpervlsion O HS O S 0 U O HU
Oi Overall OHS OS OU O HU
62 Borrower performance Rating
D Preparation OHS OS O U O HU
Li Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU
Li Implementation agency performance OHS OS OU O HU
Li Overall OHS OS O U O HU
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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
I MOFE Public Finance Division, "Borrower's Final Evaluation Report"
2. FSS International Organization Team, "The Final Evaluation Report of the Supervisory Strengthening
Project"
3. MOFE Sec-urities Policy Division, "Final Evaluation Report: Securities Market Regulations,
Infi-astructure, and Industry"
4. FSS Organization and Budgeting Team, "The Financial Supervisory Service Establishmnent Project"
5 MOFE Treasury Division, "Debt Management Improvements: Final Evaluation"
6. MOFE Treasury Division, "Govemment Bond Market Development: Final Evaluation"
7. FSC Market Monitoring Division, "Corporate Restructuring: Assessment"
8. KFTC International Affairs Division, "KFTC Competition Policy Assessment"
9. FSC Banlc Supervision Division, " Financial Sector Crisis Management Capability Assessment"
10. MOJ Office of Legal Cotmsel, "Insolvency and Corporate Governance Assessment"
11. KICPA Research Department, "Accounting and Audit Reform Assessment"
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Additional Annex 8. Summary of Borrower's Final Evaluation Report
Korea: Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project:
Borrower's Final Evaluation Report
This Final Evaluation Report by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) of the Financial
and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project reviews and comments on the following Project
components: (i) Financial Supervisory Service Establishment; (ii) Supervisory Strengthening; (iii) Financial
Sector Crisis Management; (iv) Corporate Restructuring; (v) Securities Marlcet Regulations, Infrastructure,
and Industry; (vi) Govenmment Bond Marlcet Development; (vii) Accounting Refonn; (viii) Debt
Management Improvement; (ix) Insolvency Reform; (x) Corporate Govemance Reforn; and (xi)
Competition Policy. All components are considered Satisfactoly or better. The Financial Sector Crisis
Management component and the Competition Policy component are deemed Highly Satisfactory.
Key lessons from this project include the following:
The value of outside intemational best-practice experience in addressing corporate and financial
sector distress;
* The need for expeditious procurement procedures in a crisis situation;
The importance of reaching consensus on restructuring requirements, within advisory groups, with
financial institution clients, and with distressed companies;
* The importance of reaching consensus on supporting legal/regulatory refonns among government
officials, private sector experts, and foreign experts; and
The importance of legislative reforn and institutional capacity-building to support long-term
recovery from a crisis and ongoing refonns to avoid a future crisis.
The Financial Supervisory Service Establishment component aimed at consolidating four
pre-existing regulatory bodies into the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), a newly integrated financial
supervisory authority in Korea, and improving Korea's financial sector supervision capacity. This
component covered (1) implementation of a new organizational structure (including infonnation sharnng
process, budgeting process, etc.) for the FSS, and (2) building an effective human resources system (e g.,
perfonnance evaluation, career development). The FSS was structured primarily around the core processes
of authorization, policy, exammation, and enforcement so as to enable it to keep up with the bluning of the
traditional boundaries among financial services, and, secondarily, by the type of business entities the FSS
was to supervise, i.e., banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and non-bank financial service
providers. The human resource process was also significantly revamped to ensure that the FSS was staffed
by professionals. This included (1) career development planning, (2) performance-based evaluation,
compensation, and promotion, and (3) realignment of staff grades and positions consistently and fairly
throughout the entire organizational structure.
Consultanit recommendations were mostly accepted. Recommendations for structuring FSS by
business area and function into 36 departments and 6 offices were accepted. All HR recommendations on
staffing, personnel policy, rank adjustment, evaluation, compensation, career path, recruiting, and
budgeting were accepted.
Because effective supervision of financial institutions is essential, this component As such, the
Project aimed at creating a high-perfonning supervisory organization in line with international standards
capable of improving the financial soundness of financial institutions and companies and lowering the
likehhood of systematic failures in the financial market.
It has made a significant contribution to creating an efficient and effective financial supervisory
system in Korea by successfully integrating four previously separate supervisory bodies. Transparent
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execution of financial supervision-e.g., issuance of licenses for financial institutions-was accomplished
through operational independence from the governnent.
The consolidated FSS has produced the following benefits: (i) consumers have stroniger and more
competitive financial institutions from which to choose financial services and receive greater protection for
their assets as a result of successful financial and corporate restructuring; (ni) financial institutions are
subject to better-coordinated and more efficient supervision and generally an improved business
environment, with less political influence; and (iii) the govermment now has access to much more reliable
and timely information. This component deserves much credit for successfuil consolidation of the four
pre-existing supervisory bodies and for improved soundness and stability of Korea's financial markets.
The Supervisory Strengthening component was intended to (1) establish prudential regulations
and supervisory practices that would further enhance the supervisory procedures of the integrated FSS; (2)
bring them in line with international best practices; and (3) improve financial surveillance and examination
policy procedures.
The project proceeded in two stages. First, the consultant analyzed and evaluated all FSS
supervisory operations for each of the four financial sectors: banlcing, non-banking, securities, and
ins,urance. Second, based on first stage results, the consultant made detailed proposals to enhance core
FSS supervisory functions (e.g., off-site surveillance, on-site examinations, risk-based supervision, and
supervision of electronic transactions). A detailed action plan based on the consulting results and review
comments of related staff members was established in December 2000. Items within the action plan have
either been already performed or are currently being executed.
This component will foster a long-tern course of actions to detect problems within the overall
supervision process. The componenit is expected to boost the supervision process through a detailed
development scheme, focusing on major supervision functions, and to produce a means to implement it
The Project also produced market-oriented processes whenever possible. These methods allow for gathering
the opmions of the supervised financial institutions and other related institutions and focusing on how
actual supervision activity is accepted by marlcet participants. This component will also improve the
international reputation of the FSS through the support by the World Bank and consultations with outside
experts.
The efforts by the World Bank were quite helpful and contributed to the successful completion of
the project. World Bank support was of primary importance during consultant selection, project planning
and implementation; and supervision. The component teani within the FSS also did its utmost to
coordinate with the World Bank and maximize benefits from this technical assistance Involvement by FSS
professionals with long-tenn experience within each sector contributed to the success of the project.
The Financial Sector Crisis Management component was designed for the purposes of
facilitating, and providing suppolt for, the restructuring of Korean financial institutions without adequate
restructuring experiences and knowledge and the crisis management by employment of advisory groups
The objectives of this component were appropriate. One consulting firm conducted comprehensive
evaluations of management strategies submitted by 14 banks, while anotlher consultant reviewed financial
projections by 18 banks. This approach was in line with the purposes of strengthening the financial
institutions' risk management and restructuring capabilities.
This component has been successfully carried out in many respects, because there were sufficient
consultations on the employment of advisory groups between the World Bank and the Korean Govermnent.
Employing internationally known advisory groups helped to improve transparency of the financial sector
restructuring in Korea and its external credibility. "Best Practice Guidelines" on cnsis management for the
financial sector made available by the advisory groups allowed financial institutions to effectively cany out
benclunarking activities, as a consequence of which the financial sector restructuring was a significant
success. Given tile foregoing, the financial sector crisis managemrient by outside advisory groups has been
highly satisfactory.
This component was carried out in close consultations with the World Bank. Under consultations
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with the World Bank, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) had developed Guidelines for
Strengthening The Financial Sector Crisis Management Capabilities, pursuiant to which outside advisory
groups were employed. By moderating differing issues and opinions between and among the World Bank,
financial institutions and the outside advisory groups, thereby contributing to the facilitation and
implementation of the Project, the FSC carried out its central role for the component satisfactorily.
Total budget estimated by the World Bank was in line with intemational practices in view of the
Project duration, hourly wages for members of advisory groups, and living expenses involved. Having
Koreans participate in the outside advisory groups also helped to resolve differences both linguistic and
cultural between the advisory groups and the FSC, thereby facilitating the implementation of the Project.
In the early phase of the Project particularly, the Bank deployed its staff within the Commission to ensure
the successful selection of the outside advisoly groups by supervising placement of advertisements,
remittance of letters of invitation, and requests for proposal, among others. Where conflicts of interest and
opinions may arise between the outside advisory groups and the Govemrnment, the Banlc internediated and,
further, identified to resolve issues and receive recommendations relating to the advisory activities of the
outside advisory groups by having its personnel visit with the Commission, when and as necessary. We are
highly satisfied with the high interest and unyielding support the Bank extended.
The FSC has learned that services provided by the outside advisory groups in this context, have
helped the Korean Government to develop capabilities to review and manage issues and problems that may
arise while carrying out the refonn since the crisis. The success of refonn depends upon how well trials
and errors are miimmized, in the context of which we believe that the utilization of the outside advisory
groups was a successful strategy.
The Corporate Restructuring component was to provide creditor financial institutions with
professional advisory service m restructuring of their debtor companies. Accordingly, a consortium of
financial experts offered teclnical consultations to lead banks in restructLring big business groups,
including the top five. In this way, the component helped to promote creditor-led, autonomous corporate
restructuring. The advisory group constitutes mainly investment bankers and other financial professionals
includmg lawyers, consultants, and accountants. An advisory group was placed in each of five major
commnercial banks: Woori Bank, Chohung Bank, Korea First Bank, Seoul Bank, and Korea Exchange Bank
Because the World Bank, the Korean government, and creditor financial institutions reached an
agreement regarding the issue of huring advisors, overall implementation of the project was rather smooth
But there were some obstacles that delayed the process: i) disagreement between creditor financial
institutions and the advisory group regarding such matters as fees, scope of work, confidentiality, and
advisors' liability; ii) conflict of interest among groups of advisors that provided consultation to banks or
coimpames that were in competition with their previous clients; iii) delay in consensus building among
advisors; iv) delay in execution due to lack of orientation aunong budget, execution, and legal teamns, among
others, within the World Bank itself.
By employing internationally renowned financial advisors, corporate restructuling process was
done in a transparent manner and gained external credibility. With the help of intemational advisors,
Korea's restructuring endeavors to overcome the foreign exchange crisis in both financial and corporate
sectors were widely recognized in the international business community. Considering these positive results,
the project is deemed satisfactory. In addition, the project provided inexperienced loan officers in domestic
financial institutions with an opportunity to gain knowledge and hands-on experiences about restrLctLuing
that were on par with international practice. The advisors assisted financial instituLtions in such areas as
loan evaluation and management, as well as setting up an early warning system for ailing companies. They
also conducted frequent seminars and on-site traming about restructunng techniques.
The colporate restructuring component satisfactory. Even from the beginning of the project, the
World Bank, the government, and creditor financial institutions, as well as advisors agreed on the
importance of corporate restructuring and, accordingly, participated in the project with high enthusiasm
and motivation. The project was carried out in close consultation with the WB even from the preparation
- 20 -
stage. On May 15, 1998, through consultation with the WB, "Policy Directions of Corporate
Restructuring" was drafted, based on which a team of advisors was convened. The FSC laid out thorough
preparation of the project in such relevant areas as budgeting, execution, and managemiienit. To carry out
these demanding tasks, special task force teams were formed. From the initial stage of the project, the FSC
implemented the hiring of advisors based on its thorough licnowledge of the WB's procurement regulation.
The FSC consulted the WB for its advice and no objection for salient matters related to selection of
advisors. Subsequently, the FSC consistently monitored the progress of advisors' work mainly to identify
and resolve obstacles and problems in a prompt manner. The FSC peifonned its leading role in a
satisfactory manner for the successful implementation of the project through promptly mediating different
views among the WB, the MOFE, creditors, and advisors.
The World Bank's basic notion of seeking financial professionals' advice for more effective
corporate restructuring was in line with the govermment's principal policy directions. By consulting
internationally established financial experts, Korea's refonn efforts could gain wide scope of international
recognition. Domestic financial institutions' market confidence and corporate transparency were restored,
which helped to increase foreign capital inducement. The World Bank's total budget for the project deemed
in par with international practice, considering its total duration, and advisors' fees and living expenses
The WB's idea of including Korean work force in the advisors' team was also successful for effective
negotiations with creditors as this helped overcome linguistic and cultural barriers.
From the initial preparation to the final stage, the WB extended active support and advice for
successful implementation. It was especially helpful to have the WB staff to work at the FSC and assist
the FSC officers in their interaction with foreign counterparts. In cases of conflicts between advisors and
creditors, the WB assumed the role of mediator. Further, officers from the WB head office were sent to the
FSC on a periodic basis to identify and resolve difficulties and problems that advisors were experiencing in
their performance. However, there were some delays in getting an approval, or "no objection" fiom the
WB for hiring new advisors. This made it difficult to promptly allocate advisory service as it was needed.
Further, during the wrap up process, because of the WB's intemal reorganization and transfers of
personnel, steady work assistance was often interrupted. The project helped raise the awareness of the
importance of having foreign experts to ensure transparent implementation of corporate restLctuLring.
Also, the quality of assistance and level of interest by the WB toward thorough preparation and consistent
advisory activities was overall satisfactory.
Main lessons included the need for awareness of international practice; more expeditious
procurement in a crisis situation; importance of timely consensus wlthin advisory groups, and overcoming
concerns about confidentiality.
Securities Market Regulations, Infrastructure, and Industry component focused on
development of the securities market. Before the foreign currency crisis in 1997, short-term borrowing
from banks was the major financial source for companies. As a result, the financial status of companies
was extremely vulnerable to outside shock. To reduce this kind of risk, the government needed to induce
companies to finance more from securities market. Therefore, the development of sound secturities market
was considered to be one of the most important tasks for recovery from the foreign curTency crisis and for
the future development of the Korean economy. To prepare a specific plan, the Korean government with
support from outside consultants undertook two research projects: one on strengthening the Micro
Architecture of the Capital Market and Self-Regulatory Functions; and the other on Strengthening
Regulation on the SoLmdness of Financial Institutions and Intemal-Control System.
Definition of project objectives was Highly Satisfactory. Project design and implementation of the
project was Satisfactory. The study project has provided credible and useful infonration for the Korean
government by comparing the domestic market and foreign advanced marlcets as well as analyzing foreign
advanced markets. The study project facilitated the Korean government in preparing policy alternatives.
The government asked the agency to improve their research report in March 2001 because the
report was unsatisfactory. The project was then prolonged to December 2001. The govemment has made
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continual improvements m local securities markets: e.g., improved corporate governance; facilitation of
ESOPs; auditor mdependence; and sanctions for unfair dealings.
The implementing agencies were composed of specialists in relevant fields. They were able to
efficiently analyze the current status of Korean securities market and provide a good advice and policy
proposals. They also provided reliable and useful views on the difference between the Korean secuntles
market and foreign advanced markets. The comparison with foreign advanced market highlighted the
weakness of the Korean securities market. The implementing agencies also provided a theoretic basis for
policy alternatives by explaining the background, objectives, effects, and pnnciples of each policy
The World Bank played a very important role in deternining the fundamenital project identification
and cooperated closely with the Korean government in prepanng the project. The World Banlk and Korean
govermnent exchanged their opinions on selecting concrete subjects of research and the agency that would
carry out the project. It promoted the efficiency of the project. As a supervisor, the World Bank carried out
its role very well. It checked the contents of the expenditure and also examined the research report.
One lesson is the importance of exchanging opinions and communication among specialists of the
private sector, government, and foreign institutions in preparing appropriate policies. For example, the
proposals made by agencies composed of specialists of the private sector, most of whom were scholars,
were sometimes too abstract and insufficiently practical.
Government Bond Market Development component. The Korean govermnent bond market was
extremely underdeveloped at the time of Korean foreign exchange crisis of 1997, althouglh there was a
tremendous need for raising funds to overcome the crisis. Raising the necessary money without raismg
taxes required the large-scale issuance of government bonds. Unfortunately, Korean government bonds
were traded in such small amounts as to be unattractive to the investors due to a lack of liquidity. Under
such circumstances opting to expand the Korean bond market as suggested by the World Bank (WB) was a
necessary adventure. In this regard, the objective of the project was satisfactory.
The project began with two WB seminars for the Korean government. One had to do with the study
of government bond issuance management strategies and the other dealt witlh establishing a primary dealer
system in Korea. Anned with the results of these studies the Korean government has undertakcen significant
refonns of the government bond issuance system. The result of these developmental steps and progressive
participation of market players, has been the transformation of Korean government bonds inlto the most
attractive domestic financial markcet investment.
In all phases, including the planning, follow-up, and conclusion of this project, the cooperation and
assistance of WB staff has been highly satisfactory. The advice given was timely, accurate and relevant.
There is nothing to be desired so far as cooperation with the WB is concerned.
The Accounting Reform component was designed to develop an enhanced continuing professional
education program (CPE) for accountants and to enhance professional ethics. A consultanlt reviewed and
made recommendations on CPE. Component objectives and design were satisfactory, but implementation
has lagged. The regulation on CPE was formulated in October 2002. Another consultant reviewed and
made recommendations on ethical standards. Again, component objectives and design were satisfactory but
implementation has lagged, as the Code of Ethics will be formulated only by end-2002. Implementation by
the Korea Institute of Certified Public Accountants is deemed satisfactory. In addition, the Ministry of
Finance and Economy also rationalized the institutional fiamework for standard setting and professional
oversight; extended external audit requwrements to additional entities; and supported the introduction of
audit committees into boards of directors.
Debt Management Improvement component. Because the Korean govemment debt has
ballooned since the economic cnsis, it has become increasingly urgent that more effective debt management
policies be inplemented. The purpose of this project was to devise and implement an efficient debt
management strategy. In this sense the objective was clear, relevant, timely, and important for improving
the fiscal soumdness of Korean government.
Domestic specialists and international consultants provided the expertise necessaly for developing
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and operating the Sovereign Asset Liability Management System (SALMS). SALMS was designed to
improve the flow of such sovereign debt management infoination to govermnent decision-makers as: debt
profile analyses; currency and interest rate risk assessments; and infonration systems for front, middle, and
back-office ftnctions of public debt management The system hardware was installed at the Govermnent
Debt Management Team (GDMT), which is a task force in MOFE Treasury Bureau. The
GDMT-managed system has made it possible to systematically analyze a mounitain of govemment
debt-related data, and assess the risks associated with the current Korean government debt stnicture. This
allows the Korean government to select the best strategy for minimizing medium to long-term costs and
risks. GDMT has also been advising the MOFE director-general in charge of debt management, so as to
facilitate appropriate decisions regarding the amount of debt issuance and repayment schedules. In this
sense, the achievement of the objective has been satisfactory.
The Insolvency and Corporate Governance components were designed to improve corporate
governing and corporate insolvency law and to send judges and public prosecutors on overseas study. As a
result of the corporate govemance consulting project, 3 public prosecutors stLdied at Stanford University in
the U.S. and a domestic workshop was held. Based on the consultants report, a reform of Korea's business
law was proposed to the National Assembly in December 2000 and enacted in July 2001. It covered
minority shareholder protections and enhancements to boards of directors. As a result of the insolvency
law project, 4 judges and 5 public prosecutors conducted an overseas study tour and a domestic workshop
was held. Results of the consulting report and workshop have been provided to a Ministry of Justice
insolvency refonn working group which is preparing refonn legislation for the National Assembly.
The project has been contributed much to the corporate governance and corporate insolvency law
by studying these of USA, Gennany, and Japan, and diagnosis of the problem of Korean insolvency law by
experts of law such as law finns interior and exterior of Korea. The project for reforming corporate
governance and corporate insolvency law is generally satisfactory.
The corporate governance and insolvency refonn components corresponded with Korea
govermment's effort to overcome foreign exchange cnsis. By receiving advice and consultations from the
world-renowned law firms and lawyers, corporate restructuring effort by Korea govermment was backed
and supported by lawful and regulated ways which resulted in Improvement of corporate and nation's
competitiveness The Working Group for Legislation System Refonn was established with law professors,
prosecutors, and judges under MOJ which oversaw a smooth and consistent progress of the project such as
checkmg on the status and progress of advisory consulting project, and plan and execution of overseas
training.
From the beginning of the project, World Bank gave much advice and support. Especially, a
World Banlc representative regularly visited MOJ, and helped on the legislation for the improvement of
corporate govemance and corporate insolvency law by checlcing on the legislation progress and giving
examples on other nations' legislations. The World Banlc's interest and support for MOJ is generally
satisfactory.
The Competition Policy component focused on three areas: sharing infonnation and know-how
on OECD best practice, including advice on laws and guidelines from international experts; training
seminars and workshops; and overseas internship programs for KIFTC staff. OECD best practice and
expert advice in competition policy were very useful in refonn of Korea's laws and guidelines At the samne
time, the workshops and overseas internships played a substantial role in strengthening staff know-how and
capacity. Perfonrance can be rated as highly satisfactory.
The project was successfully implemented by KFTC for 24 months from September 1998 to
September 2000. KFTC undertook the project with the aim of strengthemng competition policy in Korea
via consultation with the IBRD. Firstly, KFTC entrusted external expert institutions with 7 projects to
collect infonnation on institutions and implementation procedures of competition authorities in advanced
countries and OECD best practice. Those projects also included research on ways to improve and refonn
the content and enforcement of Korean competition law. Secondly, KFTC invited members of competition
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authorities and academic experts from the U.S. to hold 2 workshops on competition policy for the KFTC
staff. Thirdly, by organizing 2 long-tenn and 3 short-tern overseas intemship programs, the KFTC
enabled its staff to attain the know-how and imnplementation experience of competition authority officials
from the U.S , EU and Australia.
Assistance from this component aided the KFTC in its efforts to elimtinate most domestic
cross-debt guarantees; to investigate and punish improper intra-group transactions, to abolish 20 cartels
under 1999 legislation; and to improve standards and procedures for reviews of cartels and merger and
acquisition (M&A) transactions. These efforts raised KFTC's status both domestically and internationally.
For example, KFTC was named vice chair of the OECD Competition Committee and, through its KP
(Knowledge Partnership) with the World Bank and hosting of the Global Competition Policy Workshop,
KFTC is actively seeking to dissemnate its know-how and experience of competition policy
implementation to developing and transition economies around the world. Performance in this area can be
rated as highly satisfactory.
The World Banlc's inclusion of the competition policy component in Korea's financial and
corporate restructuring project design was desirable and effective. The vulnerability of the financial and
industrial sector to the financial crisis was because Korea lacked a system which functioned properly to
enhance corporate efficiency through market competition. KFTC consulted frequently with Bank staff,
who were eager to provide advice and monitor the project and helped to complete it with complete success.
The Bank's performance was highly satisfactory.
Key lessons included the importance of legislative reform and capacity building to ensure lasting
results. In this regard, the World Bank's approach was appropriate. Reform should reflect the
characteristics of the country in question. It is also desirable to encourage more training opportunities for
high ranking decision makers. The effective implementation of competition policy depends as much on
building a pro-competition framework that encompasses all aspects of economic policy as it does on the
capacity of a competition authority.
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